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Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

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APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office

Elen C. John

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, San Francisco, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of India who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured entry into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to remain in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse and children.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on the applicant's husband and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. On appeal, counsel states that a brief and/or additional evidence was to be submitted to the AAO within 30 days; however, as of this date, no additional documentation has been received. Thus, the record is complete. Counsel submits a brief statement on appeal in which he contends that the applicant's husband would experience extreme hardship if the applicant were removed from the United States. Counsel brings up issues relating to hardship caused to the applicant's children, but this is not a factor considered in determining a § 212(i) waiver. The entire record has been reviewed in making this determination.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

The record reflects that the applicant made a willful misrepresentation of a material fact by using a Swedish passport belonging to another individual to enter the United States in 1997. A § 212(i) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from violation of § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien herself or her children experience upon deportation is irrelevant to § 212(i) waiver proceedings; the only relevant hardship in the present case is hardship suffered by the applicant's husband. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-566 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

Counsel contends that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of the applicant's inadmissibility. On appeal, counsel asserts that the "breakdown in the family structure" will cause the applicant's husband hardship. Counsel also notes that the emotional separation and financial weight of maintaining two homes would cause the applicant's husband extreme harship. There is no evidence on the record, however, that the applicant's husband would suffer financial hardship upon the applicant's removal, nor are his children required by law to accompany the applicant outside the United States. Counsel provides no evidence in support of the assertions made on appeal.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's husband will be faced with difficult choices as a result of separation from the applicant. However, his situation is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See § 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.